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Abstract—In this paper, an attack-resilient estimation algo-
rithm is presented for linear discrete-time stochastic systems
with state and input constraints. It is shown that the state
estimation errors of the proposed estimation algorithm are
practically exponentially stable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have been of paramount
importance in power systems, critical infrastructures, trans-
portation networks and industrial control systems for many
decades [1]. Recent cases of CPS attacks have clearly illus-
trated the vulnerability of CPS and raised awareness of the
security challenges in these systems. These include attacks
on large-scale systems, such as the StuxNet virus attack on an
industrial supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system [2], German steel mill cyber attack [3], and attacks
on modern vehicles [4], [5].
Literature review. Traditionally, cyber-attack detection has
been studied by monitoring the cyber-space misbehavior [6].
With the emergence of CPS, it becomes vitally important
to monitor the physical misbehavior as well, because the
attacks on CPS always have an impact on physical systems.
Model-based detection has been intensively studied in recent
years. Attack detection has been formulated as an `0/`∞ op-
timization problem, which is non-deterministic polynomial-
time hard (NP-hard) in [7]–[9]. A convex relaxation has
been studied in [7], [9]. On top of this, the worst case
estimation error has been analysed in [9]. A residual-based
detector has been designed for power systems against false
data injection attacks, and the impact of attacks has been
analyzed in [10]. Linear algebraic conditions, as well as
graph-theoretic conditions for detectability and identifiability
have been provided in [11]. A multi-rate controller to detect
zero-dynamic attacks has been designed in [12]. While most
of the detection techniques were passive, some papers have
studied active detection [13], [14], where the control input
is watermarked with a pre-designed scheme that sacrifices
optimality. The attack detection problem has been formulated
as a simultaneous estimation problem of the state and the
unknown input in [15]. The approach has been extended to
nonlinear systems in [16], constrained systems in [17], and
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stochastic random set methods in [18]. The aforementioned
detection algorithms rely on stochastic thresholds. For accu-
rate detection, a smaller covariance is desired.
To reduce the covariance, the current paper focuses on
information aggregation. In particular, we consider inequality
state constraints and input constraints. There is a rich liter-
ature on Kalman filter with constraints [19]–[21]. We refer
to [22] for more details for constrained filtering. Unknown
input estimation algorithm with input constraints is intro-
duced in [17]. The current paper considers both inequality
state and input constraints for unknown input estimation.
Contribution. We design an attack-resilient estimation
algorithm given inequality constraints on the states and the
attacks. The proposed algorithm consists of actuator attack
estimation and state estimation. For each step, we design an
optimal linear estimator without considering the constraints
and then project the estimates onto the constrained space. We
prove that the projection reduces the estimation error, as well
as the error covariance. The practical exponential stability of
the estimation error is proved formally. A numerical simu-
lation on multi-agent robotic system shows the performance
of the proposed attack-resilient estimation algorithm.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
and notations, preliminaries on χ2 test detection and the
problem statement. Section III-A describes the high-level
idea of the algorithm. Section III-B gives a detailed algorithm
derivation. Section IV investigates stability analysis of the
algorithm, and all the proofs are presented in Appendix
for compactness. Section V presents a numerical simulation.
Section VI draws conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section discusses some preliminary knowledge in-
cluding notations, motivation, and problem statement.
A. Notations
The following notations are adopted: We use the sub-
script k of xk to denote the time index; Rn denotes the n-
dimensional Euclidean space; Rn×m denotes the set of all
n×m real matrices; A>, A−1, A†, diag(A), tr(A) and rk(A)
denote the transpose, inverse, Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse,
diagonal, trace and rank of matrix A, respectively; I denotes
the identity matrix with an appropriate dimension; ‖ · ‖
denotes the standard Euclidean norm for vector or an induced
matrix norm; E[ · ] denotes the expectation operator;× is used
to denote matrix multiplication when the multiplied terms
are in different lines. For a symmetric matrix S, S > 0 and
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S≥ 0 indicates that S is positive definite and positive semi-
definite, respectively. For a vector a, (a)(i) = a(i) denotes
the ith element in the vector a. Finally a, aˆ, a˜, a− aˆ denote
the true value, estimate and estimation error of a.
B. Motivation
1) χ2 test for detection: In attack detection for stochastic
systems, the χ2 test is widely used [14], [23]. The χ2 test
can be stated as:
Given a sample vˆ of a Gaussian random vector v with un-
known mean and known covariance Σv, the χ2 test provides
statistical evidence of whether v = 0 or not. The sample is
being normalized by vˆ>Σ−1v vˆ and compared with χ2 test
value. If vˆ>Σ−1v vˆ > χ2, then we reject the null hypothesis
H0 : v = 0, and accept alternative hypothesis H1 : v 6= 0; i.e.,
there is significant statistical evidence that v is non-zero.
Otherwise, we accept the null hypothesis; i.e., there is no
significant evidence that v is non-zero.
Given a fixed attack input v 6= 0 and attack input estimate
vˆ 6= 0, a smaller covariance induces a larger normalized
test value vˆ>Σ−1v vˆ, which decreases false negative rates.
To reduce the covariance, the minimum variance estimation
method is being considered intensively [24]–[26]. The cur-
rent paper pursues an optimal filter design technique.
2) Constraints: It has been shown that constraints can be
used to further reduce the covariance in optimal filtering;
i.e., state constraints in Kalman filter (KF) [21], [22], and
input constraints in input and state estimation (ISE) [17]. We
consider linear filtering with both input and state constraints
to reduce false negative rates in attack detection and to
achieve accurate state estimation. The constraints are induced
by unmodeled dynamics and operational processes. Some of
these examples include vision-aided inertial navigation [27],
target tracking [28] and power systems [17], [29].
C. Problem Statement
Consider the linear time-varying discrete-time stochastic
system:
xk+1 = Akxk +Bkuk +Gkdk +wk
yk =Ckxk + vk,
(1)
where xk ∈ Rn, uk ∈ Rm, dk ∈ Rp and yk ∈ Rl are the state,
the known input, the unknown actuator attack and sensor
measurement, respectively. Noises wk and vk are assumed
to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian
random variables with zero means and covariances Qk ,
E[wkw>k ] ≥ 0 and Rk , E[vkv>k ] > 0 respectively. Moreover,
vk is also uncorrelated with the initial state x0 and process
noise wk. We assume that rk(CkGk−1) = p as in [30], [31].
In the cyber-space, digital attack signals could be uncon-
strained, but their impact on the physical world is restricted
by physical and operational constraints (i.e., dk is con-
strained). Any physical constraints and ability limitations on
states and actuator attacks are presented by known inequality
constraints:
Akdk ≤ bk, Bkxk ≤ ck. (2)
We assume that the feasible sets of the constraints Akdk ≤
bk and Bkxk ≤ ck are non-empty. The vectors bk and ck,
matrices Ak,Bk,Ak,Bk,Ck and Gk are known and bounded.
The attacker is able to inject any signal dk that satisfies the
constraint in (2).
The estimator design problem, addressed in this paper,
can be stated as: Given a linear discrete-time stochastic
system (1) with constraints on the actuator attack and state
(2), design an attack-resilient and stable filtering algorithm
that simultaneously estimates the system state and actuator
attack.
III. ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we design an attack-resilient estimation
algorithm with inequality constraints. The algorithm design
is motivated by unknown input estimation [30]–[32], and
a projection method for inequality constraint [17], [22].
We design an estimation algorithm as in [30]–[32] without
considering the constraint, then project the estimates using
inequality constraints as in [17], [22].
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Fig. 1: The algorithm consists of two parts: optimal estimation and
information aggregation. The optimal estimation provides unbiased
minimum variance estimates (if the previous state estimate is
unbiased) that then be projected in the information aggregation for
better estimates.
A. Algorithm Statement
Given the measurements up to time k and previous state
estimate xˆk−1|k−1, the proposed algorithm can be summarized
as follows:
1) Prediction:
xˆk|k−1 = Ak−1xˆk−1|k−1+Bk−1uk−1 (3)
2) Actuator attack estimation:
dˆuk−1 = Mk(yk−Ckxˆk|k−1) (4)
dˆk−1 = argmin
d
(d− dˆuk−1)>(Pd,uk−1)−1(d− dˆuk−1)
subject to Ak−1d ≤ bk−1 (5)
3) Time update:
xˆ?k|k = xˆk|k−1+Gk−1dˆ
u
k−1 (6)
4) Measurement update:
xˆuk|k = xˆ
?
k|k +Lk(yk−Ckxˆ?k|k) (7)
xˆk|k = argmin
x
(x− xˆuk|k)>(Px,uk )−1(x− xˆuk|k)
subject to Bkx≤ ck, (8)
Given the previous state estimate xˆk−1|k−1, the defender
can predict the current state xˆk|k−1 under the assumption
that the unknown actuator attack is absent (i.e., dk−1 = 0)
in (3). The estimation of the unconstrained actuator attack
dˆuk−1 can be obtained by observing the difference between
the predicted output Ckxˆk|k−1 and the measured output yk
in (4), and Mk is the filter gain that is chosen to minimize the
input error covariances Pdk . Then, we apply the constraints on
the unconstrained actuator attack estimate in (5) and obtain
the constrained actuator attack estimation dˆk−1. The state
prediction xˆk|k−1 can be updated incorporating the actuator
attack estimate dˆuk in (6). In (7), the output yk is used to
correct the current state estimate as in KF, where Lk is
the filter gain that is chosen to minimize the state error
covariance Px,uk . The state constraints are applied in (8) to
obtain the constrained state estimation xˆk|k. The algorithm
is summarized in Fig. 1 and presented in Algorithm 1. The
detailed algorithm derivation is described in Section III-B.
B. Algorithm Derivation
1) Prediction: Given the previous state estimate xˆk−1|k−1,
and the system model (1), the current state can be predicted
by (3) under the assumption that the actuator attack dk is
absent. Its error covariance matrix is
Pxk|k−1 , E[x˜k|k−1x˜>k|k−1] = Ak−1Pxk−1A>k−1+Qk−1,
where Pxk ,E[x˜k|kx˜>k|k] is the state estimation error covariance
matrix.
2) Actuator attack estimation: The linear actuator attack
estimator in (4) utilizes the difference between the measured
output yk and the predicted output Ckxˆk|k−1. Substituting (1)
and (3) into (4), we have
dˆuk−1 =Mk(CkAk−1x˜k−1|k−1+CkGk−1dk−1+Ckwk−1+ vk),
which is a linear function of the actuator attack dk. Applying
the method of least squares from [33], which gives linear
minimum-variance unbiased estimates, we can get the opti-
mal gain in actuator attack estimation:
Mk = (G>k−1C
>
k R˜
−1
k CkGk−1)
−1G>k−1C
>
k R˜
−1
k ,
where R˜k , CkPxk|k−1Ck + Rk. It error covariance matrix is
found by
Pdk−1 = MkR˜kM
>
k = (G
>
k−1C
>
k R˜
−1
k CkGk−1)
−1.
We are now in the position to apply the constraint in (2). The
problem is formulated as the constrained convex optimization
problem:
dˆk−1 = argmin
d
(d− dˆuk−1)>W dk−1(d− dˆuk−1)
subject to Ak−1d ≤ bk−1,
(9)
where W dk−1 can be any positive definite symmetric weighting
matrix. In the current paper, we choose W dk−1 = (P
d,u
k−1)
−1
which results in the smallest error covariance as shown
in [19]. From Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of
optimality, we can find the corresponding active constraints.
Algorithm 1 Attack-resilient Estimation with State and Input
Constraint: Akdk ≤ bk and Bkxk ≤ ck
Input: xˆk−1|k−1; Pxk−1;
Output: dˆk−1; Pdk−1; xˆk|k; P
x
k .
. Prediction
1: xˆk|k−1 = Ak−1xˆk−1|k−1 +Bk−1uk−1;
2: Pxk|k−1 = Ak−1P
x
k−1A
>
k−1 +Qk−1;
. Actuator attack estimation
3: R˜k =CkPxk|k−1C
>
k +Rk;
4: Mk = (G>k−1C
>
k R˜
−1
k CkGk−1)
−1G>k−1C
>
k R˜
−1
k ;
5: dˆuk−1 = Mk(yk−Ck xˆk|k−1);
6: Pd,uk−1 = (G
>
k−1C
>
k R˜
−1
k CkGk−1)
−1;
7: Pxdk−1 =−Pxk−1A>k−1C>k M>k
8: dˆk−1 = argmin
d
(d− dˆuk−1)>(Pd,uk−1)−1(d− dˆuk−1)
subject to Ak−1d ≤ bk−1;
9: ¯Ak−1 and b¯k−1 corresponding to active set;
10: γdk−1 = P
d,u
k−1 ¯A
>
k−1( ¯Ak−1P
d,u
k−1 ¯A
>
k−1)
−1;
11: Pdk−1 = (I− γdk−1 ¯Ak−1)Pd,uk−1(I− γdk−1 ¯Ak−1)>;
. Time update
12: xˆ?k|k = xˆk|k−1 +Gk−1dˆ
u
k−1;
13: P?xk = Ak−1P
x
k−1A
>
k−1 +Ak−1P
xd
k−1G
>
k−1
+Gk−1(Pxdk−1)
>A>k−1 +Gk−1P
d
k−1G
>
k−1
−Gk−1MkCkQk−1−Qk−1C>k−1M>k G>k−1 +Qk−1;
14: R˜?k =CkP
?x
k C
>
k +Rk−CkGk−1MkRk−RkM>k G>k−1C>k ;
. Measurement update
15: Lk = (P?xk C
>
k −Gk−1MkRk)R˜?†k ;
16: xˆuk|k = xˆ
?
k|k +Lk(yk−Ck xˆ?k|k);
17: Px,uk = (I−LkCk)Gk−1MkRkL>k +LkRkM>k G>k−1(I−LkCk)>
+(I−LkCk)P?xk (I−LkCk)>+LkRkL>k ;
18: xˆk|k = argmin
x
(x− xˆuk|k)>(P
x,u
k )
−1(x− xˆuk|k)
subject to Bkx≤ ck;
19: B¯k and c¯k corresponding to active set;
20: γxk = P
x,u
k B¯
>
k (B¯kP
x,u
k B¯
>
k )
−1;
21: Pxk = (I− γxk B¯k)Px,uk (I− γxk B¯k)>;
We denote by ¯Ak and b¯k the rows of Ak and the elements of
bk corresponding to the active constraints. Then (9) becomes
dˆk−1 = argmin
d
(d− dˆuk−1)>W dk−1(d− dˆuk−1)
subject to ¯Ak−1d = b¯k−1.
The solution of the above program can be found by
dˆk−1 = dˆuk−1− γdk−1( ¯Ak−1dˆuk−1− b¯k−1),
where γdk−1 , (W dk−1)−1 ¯A >k−1( ¯Ak−1(W dk−1)−1 ¯A >k−1)−1. Its es-
timation error is
d˜k−1 = (I− γdk−1 ¯Ak−1)d˜uk−1+ γdk−1( ¯Ak−1dk−1− b¯k−1). (10)
The error covariance matrix can be found by
Pdk−1 , E[d˜k−1d˜>k−1] = (I− γdk−1 ¯Ak−1)Pd,uk−1(I− γdk−1 ¯Ak−1)>,
(11)
under the assumption that γdk−1( ¯Ak−1dk−1− b¯k−1)= 0 in (10).
The cross error covariance matrix of the state estimate and
the actuator attack estimate is
Pxdk−1 =−Pxk−1A>k−1C>k M>k .
3) Time update: Given the actuator attack estimate dˆuk−1,
the state prediction xˆk|k−1 can be updated as in (6). We can
derive the error covariance matrix of xˆ?k|k as
P?xk , E[(x˜?k|k)(x˜?k|k)>] = Ak−1Pxk−1A>k−1+Ak−1Pxdk−1G>k−1
+Gk−1Pdxk−1A
>
k−1+Gk−1P
d
k−1Gˆ
>
k−1+Qk−1
−Gk−1MkCkQk−1−Qk−1C>k−1M>k G>k−1, (12)
where Pdxk−1 = (P
xd
k−1)
>.
4) Measurement update: In this step, the measurement
yk is used to update the propagated estimate xˆ?k|k as shown
in (7). The covariance matrix of the state estimation error is
Px,uk , E[(x˜
u
k|k)(x˜
u
k|k)
>] = (I−LkCk)Gk−1MkRkL>k +LkRkL>k
+LkRkM>k G
>
k−1(I−LkCk)>+(I−LkCk)P?xk (I−LkCk)>.
The gain matrix Lk is chosen by minimizing the trace norm
of Px,uk : minLk tr(P
x,u
k ). The solution of the program is given
by
Lk = (P?xk C
>
k −Gk−1MkRk)R˜?†k ,
where R˜?k ,CkP?xk C>k +Rk−CkGk−1MkRk−RkM>k G>k−1C>k .
Now we apply the constraint in (2) to the state estimate
xˆuk|k. As Section III-B.2, we formalize the state estimation
with the constraints as the constrained convex optimization
problem:
xˆk|k = argmin
x
(x− xˆuk|k)>W xk (x− xˆuk|k)
subject to Bkx≤ ck,
(13)
where we choose W xk = (P
x,u
k )
−1 for the smallest error
covariance.
We denote by B¯k and c¯k the rows of Bk and the elements
of ck corresponding to the active constraints of (13). Using
the active constraints, we reformulate the problem (13) as
xˆk|k = argmin
x
(x− xˆuk|k)>W xk (x− xˆuk|k)
subject to B¯kx = c¯k.
(14)
The solution of the above problem is given by
xˆk|k = xˆuk|k− γxk (B¯kxˆuk|k− c¯k),
where γxk , (W xk )−1B¯>k (B¯k(W xk )−1B¯>k )−1. Under the as-
sumption that γxk (B¯kxk− c¯k) = 0 holds, the state estimation
error covariance matrix can be expressed as
Pxk = Γ¯kP
x,u
k Γ¯
>
k , (15)
where Γ¯k , I− γxkB¯k.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Section IV-A, we show that the projection induced
by inequality constraints improves attack-resilient estimation
and detection by decreasing the state estimation error and
false negative rates. However, the projection induces a biased
estimate as well (Proposition 6 in [17]). In this context, we
will seek to prove practical exponential stability, as shown
in Section IV-B. All the proofs of Theorems and Lemmas
are presented in Appendix for compactness.
A. Performance Improvement through Constraints
The projection reduces the estimation errors and the co-
variance, as formulated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: We have ‖x˜k|k‖ ≤ ‖x˜uk|k‖ and ‖d˜k‖ ≤ ‖d˜uk‖;
Pk ≤ Puk , and Pdk ≤ Pd,uk . Strict inequality holds if rk(B¯k) 6= 0,
and rk( ¯Ak) 6= 0, respectively.
The properties in Theorem 1 are desired for accurate
estimation as well as attack detection. In particular, if the
size of attack is smaller than the statistical threshold, the
χ2 detector cannot distinguish the attack from the noise.
Given dk 6= 0, the covariance reduction implies the threshold
reduction:
d>k (P
d,u
k )
−1dk ≤ d>k (Pdk )−1dk,
where the test value d>k (P
d
k )
−1dk may reject the null hypoth-
esis, while d>k (P
d,u
k )
−1dk cannot. Moreover, the estimation
error reduction implies an accurate test value:
‖d>k (Pk)−1dk− (dˆk)>(Pk)−1dˆk‖
≤ ‖d>k (Pk)−1dk− (dˆuk )>(Pk)−1dˆuk‖,
which further reduces false negative rates.
B. Stability Analysis
Although the projection reduces the estimation errors and
the covariance as shown in Theorem 1, it trades the unbiased
estimation off according to Proposition 6 in [17]. This is
because we can guarantee B¯kxk ≤ c¯k instead of B¯kxk = c¯k,
but the unconstrained estimate xˆuk|k is projected onto B¯kxk =
c¯k. In the absence of the projection ( ˜Ak = 0 and B¯k = 0,
∀k), Algorithm 1 reduces to the algorithm in [31], which is
unbiased.
It is essential to construct an update law x˜k|k from x˜k−1|k−1
to analyze stability of the estimation error. However, the
construction is not straight forward comparing to that in fil-
tering with equality constraints [17], [19] or filtering without
constraints [31], [34]. Especially, it is difficult to find the
exact relation between x˜k|k and x˜uk|k:
x˜k|k = x˜uk|k− γxk (B¯kxˆuk|k− c¯k) 6= (I− γxkB¯k)x˜uk|k,
because B¯kxk ≤ c¯k.
To address this issue, we first decompose the estimation
error x˜k|k into two orthogonal spaces
x˜k|k = (I− γxkB¯k)x˜k|k + γxkB¯kx˜k|k (16)
and then, we apply the following lemmas to each term.
Lemma 1: It holds that (I− γxkB¯k)x˜k|k = (I− γxkB¯k)x˜uk|k.
Lemma 2: It holds that γxkB¯kx˜k|k = αkγ
x
kB¯kx˜
u
k|k, where
αk = diag(α1k , · · · ,αnk ) and α ik , (γxkB¯kx˜k)(i)((γxkB¯kx˜uk)(i))†
∈ [0,1) for i = 1, · · · ,n.
According to Lemmas 1 and 2, the errors in the space I−
γxkB¯k remain identical after the projection, while the errors
in the space γxkB¯k reduce through the projection. By Lemmas
1 and 2, (16) becomes
x˜k|k = Γkx˜uk|k, (17)
where Γk , (I − γxkB¯k) +αkγxkB¯k. Note that αk is an un-
known matrix and thus cannot be used for the algorithm.
We use it only for analytical purposes.
Now under the following assumptions, we present the
stability of Algorithm 1.
Assumption 1: It holds that rk(B)< n. There exist a¯, c¯y,
g¯, m¯,
¯
q,
¯
β , β¯ > 0, such that the following holds for all k≥ 0:
‖Ak‖ ≤ a¯, ‖Ck‖ ≤ c¯y, ‖Gk‖ ≤ g¯,
‖Mk‖ ≤ m¯, Qk ≥
¯
qI.
It is assumed that rk(B) < n; i.e., the number of the state
constrains are less than the number of state variables. The
rest of Assumption 1 is widely used in literature on extended
KF [35] and nonlinear ISE [16].
Theorem 2: Consider Assumption 1 and assume that
there exist non-negative constants
¯
p and p¯ such that
¯
pI ≤
Px,uk ≤ p¯I holds for all k. Then the estimation errors x˜k|k and
d˜k are practically exponentially stable in mean square; i.e.,
there exist constants ax,ad ,bx,bd ,cx,cd such that, for all k,
E[‖x˜k‖2]≤ axe−bxkE[‖x˜0‖2]+ cx
E[‖d˜k‖2]≤ ade−bdkE[‖d˜0‖2]+ cd .
Theorem 2 holds under the assumption of boundedness
of Px,uk . One of the sufficient conditions is the uniform de-
tectability of the transformed system as shown in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: If the pair (Ck, A˜k−1) is uniformly detectable,
then there exist non-negative constants
¯
p and p¯ such that for
all k
¯
pI ≤ Px,uk ≤ p¯I,
where A˜k−1 , (I − GkMk(CkGk−1Mk)−1Ck)A¯k−1Γ¯k−1 and
A¯k−1 = (I−Gk−1MkCk)Ak−1.
V. SIMULATION
We simulate a scenario shown in Fig. 2, where a multi-
agent system that has state and input constraints gets attacked
and moves to the attacker’s desired place.
Fig. 2: Illustration of the simulation scenario: (i) red dash line
denoted the path after attack; (ii) 100 denotes the minimum distance
difference between two agents by physical state constraint.
A. Single Agent Model
We consider a double integrator dynamic model for each
agent i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, where n denotes the number of agents
in the system. In this simulation, the subscript (i) is used to
represent the agent i’s vector/matrix; e.g., x(i)k and A
(i)
k denote
the state and the system matrix of agent i. Its discrete time
state vector x(i)k that considers planar position and velocity
at time step k, is given by
x(i)k = [r
(i)
x,k,r
(i)
y,k,v
(i)
x,k,v
(i)
y,k]
>,
where r(i)x,k, r
(i)
y,k denote x,y position coordinates and v
(i)
x,k,
v(i)y,k denote velocity coordinates. The actuator attack in this
simulation is constrained by the acceleration limit, and the
state is constrained due to the speed limit and required
minimum distance between the two agents:
|d(i)k (n)+u(i)k (n)| ≤ 20, |v(i)x,k− v(i)x,k| ≤ 80;
|r(i)x,k− r( j)x,k | ≥ 100 or |r(i)y,k− r( j)y,k | ≥ 100,
where (n) denotes the nth element in the vector.
Each model is discretized into the following matrices with
sampling time of 0.1 seconds:
A(i)k =

1 0 0.1 0
0 1 0 0.1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , B(i)k = G(i)k =

0 0
0 0
0.1 0
0 0.1
 ,
and the output y(i)k is the sensor measurement of positions
and velocity; i.e., C(i)k = I. The covariance matrices of noises
are chosen as Q(i)k = 0.1I, and R
(i)
k = 0.01I.
B. Multi-agent System Model
The multi-agent system of n agents, where n ∈ N,
can be written in the form of system (1), where Ak
and Ck are diagonal matrices as follows: diag(Ak) =
(A(1), · · · ,A(i)), diag(Ck) = (C(1)k , · · · ,C(i)k ); Bk = Gk ,
[B(1), · · · ,B(i)]>. The state vector, input vector, actuator
attack and sensor measurement are denoted by xk ,
[x(1)k , · · · ,x(i)k ]>, uk , [u(1)k , · · · ,u(i)k ]>, dk , [d(1)k , · · · ,d(i)k ]>
and yk , [y(1)k , · · · ,y(i)k ]>, respectively.
C. Attack Scenario
We consider the scenario that the attacker injects the
identical actuator attack to the both agents so that they move
horizontally to the right at same time. The unknown actuator
attacks are
dk(1) = dk(3) =

20 if 100n≤ k < 40+100n,
0 if 40+100n≤ k < 60+100n,
−20 if 60+100n≤ k < 100+100n,
dk(2) = dk(4) = 0,
where n ∈ {1,2, · · · ,9}.
D. Simulation Result
Figures 3 and 4 show a comparison of the actuator attack
and state estimation with and without the constraints. When
the actuator attack estimate and the state estimate are pro-
jected to the constrained space, the constrained estimations
have smaller estimation error and smaller error covariance
as expected.
Fig. 3: Unconstrained and constrained estimation of the actuator
attack dk(1). Trace of unconstrained estimate error covariance of the
actuator attack tr(Pd,u) and constrained estimate error covariance
of the actuator attack tr(Pd).
Fig. 4: Unconstrained and constrained estimation of states (distance
difference of two agents and speed of one agent). Trace of uncon-
strained estimate error covariance of state tr(Px,u) and constrained
estimate error covariance of state tr(Px).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies attack-resilient estimation algorithm for
time-varying stochastic systems given inequality constraints
on the states and actuator attacks. We formally prove that
estimation errors and their covariances are less than those
from unconstrained algorithms, which is a desired condition
for attack detection in stochastic systems. We prove that
the estimation errors are practically exponentially stable. A
simulation is presented to reveal the attack-resilient property
and efficiency of the proposed algorithm in attack detection.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The relationship can be obtained by applying B¯kxˆk|k = c¯k
to
x˜k|k = xk− xˆk|k = xk− (xˆuk|k− γxk (B¯kxˆuk|k− c¯k))
= x˜uk|k + γ
x
k (B¯kxˆ
u
k|k− c¯k)
= x˜uk|k + γ
x
k (B¯kxˆ
u
k|k− B¯kxˆk|k)
= x˜uk|k− γxk (B¯kx˜uk|k− B¯kx˜k|k),
which implies the statement. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The solution of B¯kx≤ c¯k defines a closed convex set Ck.
The point xˆuk|k is not an element of the convex set. The point
xˆk|k has the minimum distance from xˆuk|k with metric d(a,b)=
‖a− b‖W xk in the convex set Ck by (14). Since the solution
xk is in the closed set Ck, and γxkB¯k is a weighted projection
with weigh W xk , the statement holds. 
C. Proof of Theorem 1
The statement for ‖x˜k|k‖ ≤ ‖x˜uk|k‖ and ‖d˜k‖ ≤ ‖d˜uk‖ is the
direct result of Lemmas 1 and 2.
To show the rest of properties, we first identify the equality
(I− γxkB¯k)>γxkB¯k = 0. (18)
Since B¯kγxk = I, it holds that γ
x
kB¯kγ
x
k = γ
x
k , and B¯kγ
x
kB¯k =
B¯k; i.e., γxk = B¯
†
k . Then, we have B¯
>
k (γ
x
k )
>γxk = γ
x
k ,
which implies x˜>k|k(I − γxkB¯k)>γxkB¯kx˜k|k = x˜>k|k(γxkB¯k −
B¯>k (γ
x
k )
>γxkB¯k)xˆk|k = 0. Note that (18) holds for (x˜
u
k|k)
>(I−
γxkB¯k)
>γxkB¯kx˜
u
k|k = 0 as well.
Inequalities for the covariance can be obtained by taking
the trace
tr(Pxk ) = tr((I− γxkB¯k)Pxk (I− γxkB¯k)>)
= tr((I− γxkB¯k)>(I− γxkB¯k)Pxk )
= tr(I− γxkB¯k)Pxk )
= tr(Pxk )− tr(γxkB¯kPxk ),
where (18) has been applied. Because γxkB¯kP
x
k =
(Pxk )
−1B¯>k (B¯k(P
x
k )
−1B¯>k )
−1B¯kPxk > 0, we have the
desired result. The same relation for Pdk can be obtained by
the same procedure. 
D. Proof of Theorem 3
The unconstrained state estimation error can be found by
x˜uk|k = (I−LkCk)A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1+(I−LkCk)w¯k−1+ L¯kvk,
(19)
where w¯k−1, (I−Gk−1MkCk)wk−1, and L¯k , LkCkGk−1Mk−
Lk −Gk−1Mk. Therefore, the update law of unconstrained
covariance matrix is calculated from (19) and (15):
Px,uk = (I−LkCk)A¯k−1Γ¯k−1Px,uk−1Γ¯>k−1A¯>k−1(I−LkCk)>
+ L¯kRkL¯>k +(I−LkCk)Q¯k−1(I−LkCk)>. (20)
Covariance update law (20) is identical to the covariance
update law of the KF solution of the transformed system:
xk = A¯k−1Γ¯k−1xk−1+ wˆk−1 (21)
yk =Ckxk + vk, (22)
where wˆk−1 , −Gk−1MkCkwk−1−Gk−1Mkvk +wk−1. How-
ever, in the transformed system, the process noise and
measurement noise are correlated; i.e., E[wˆk−1v>k ] =
−Gk−1MkRk 6= 0. To decouple the noises, we add a zero term
Kk(yk−Ck(A¯k−1Γ¯k−1xk+ wˆk−1)−vk) to the state equation to
obtain:
xk = A˜k−1xk−1+ u˜k−1+ w˜k−1,
where A˜k−1, (I−KkCk)A¯k−1Γ¯k−1, u˜k−1,Kkyk is the known
input, and w˜k−1 , (I−KkCk)wˆk−1−Kkvk is the new process
noise. The new process noise and the measurement noise
could be decoupled by choosing the gain Kk such that
E[w˜k−1v>k ] = 0.
The solution can be found by Kk = GkMk(CkGk−1Mk)−1.
Then, the system (22) becomes
xk+1 = A˜kxk + u˜k + w˜k
yk =Ckxk + vk.
Since the pair (Ck, A˜k) is uniformly detectable, by Corollary
5.2 in [34], the statement holds. 
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the Lyapunov function
Vk = (x˜uk|k)
>(Px,uk )
−1(x˜uk|k).
After substituting (19) into the Lyapunov function, we obtain
Vk = (x˜uk−1|k−1)
>Γ>k−1A¯
>
k−1(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1
× (I−LkCk)A¯k−1Γk−1x˜uk−1|k−1
+2(x˜uk−1|k−1)
>Γ>k−1A¯
>
k−1(I−LkCk)>
× (Px,uk )−1(I−LkCk)w¯k−1
+2(x˜uk−1|k−1)
>Γ>k−1A¯
>
k−1(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1L¯kvk
+ w¯>k−1(I−LkC2,k)>(Px,uk )−1(I−LkCk)w¯k−1
+2w>k−1(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1L¯kvk + v>k L¯k(Px,uk )−1L¯kvk.
(23)
By the uncorrelatedness property [36] of wk−1, vk and
x˜uk−1|k−1, the Lyapunov function (23) becomes
E[Vk] = E[(x˜uk−1|k−1)
>Γ>k−1A¯
>
k−1(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1
× A¯k−1(I−LkCk)Γk−1(x˜uk−1|k−1)]
+E[w¯>k−1(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1(I−LkCk)w¯k−1]
+E[v>k L¯k(P
x,u
k )
−1L¯kvk]. (24)
The following statements are formulated to deal with each
term in (24).
Claim 1: There exists a constant δ , ( ¯q
′
a¯′2 p¯ +1)
−1 ∈ (0,1),
such that Γ>k−1A¯
>
k−1(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1(I−LkCk)A¯k−1Γk−1 <
δ (Px,uk−1)
−1.
Proof: Since rk(B) < n, it holds that rk(B¯) < n and
thus Γ¯ 6= 0. Therefore, ‖Γ¯k−1‖ = 1 because γxk−1B¯k−1 is a
projection matrix. From Assumption 1 and Theorem 3, we
have
Q¯k−1 ≥
¯
q′I, Pxk−1 ≤ p¯I.
Since ‖A¯k−1‖ is upper bounded by a¯′ , a¯(1+ g¯m¯c¯y), we can
have A¯k−1A¯>k−1 ≤ a¯′2I. Then
Q¯k−1 ≥
¯
q′
A¯k−1A¯>k−1
a¯′2
≥ ¯
q′
a¯′2
A¯k−1Γ¯k−1Γ¯>k−1A¯
>
k−1
≥ ¯
q′
a¯′2 p¯
A¯k−1Γ¯k−1P
x,u
k−1Γ¯
>
k−1A¯
>
k−1. (25)
Substitution of (25) into (20) yields
Px,uk − (1+ ¯
q′
a¯′2 p¯
)(I−LkCk)A¯k−1Γ¯k−1Px,uk−1Γ¯>k−1A¯>k−1
× (I−LkCk)> > 0, (26)
where the inequality holds because R > 0. As (1 +
¯
q′
a¯′2 p¯ )P
x,u
k−1 > 0, the inverse of the left hand side of (26) exists
and is symmetric positive definite. By the matrix inversion
lemma [37], it follows that
(1+ ¯
q′
a¯′2 p¯
)−1(Px,uk−1)
−1− Γ¯>k−1A¯>k−1(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1
× (I−LkCk)A¯k−1Γ¯k−1 > 0. (27)
Since γxk−1B¯k−1 is a positive definite matrix, and ‖αk−1‖≤ 1,
we have
I− γxk−1B¯k−1 ≤ Γk−1 = I− γxk−1B¯k−1+αk−1γxk−1B¯k−1 ≤ I,
which implies ‖Γk−1‖ ≤ 1. Since ‖Γ¯k−1‖= 1 and ‖Γk−1‖ ≤
1, inequality (27) proves the claim.
Claim 2: There exists a positive constant c , p¯(1 +
l¯c¯y)2(1+ g¯m¯c¯2)2q¯ rk(Qk−1)+ p¯(l¯c¯yg¯m¯− l¯− g¯m¯)2r¯2 rk(R2,k),
such that
E[‖(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1(I−LkCk)‖‖w¯k−1‖2]
+E[‖L¯k(Px,uk )−1L¯k‖‖vk]‖2]≤ c.
Proof: The first term is bounded by:
E[‖(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1(I−LkCk)‖‖w¯k−1‖2]
=E[‖(I−LkCk)>(Px,uk )−1(I−LkCk)‖
‖(I−Gk−1MkCk)‖2‖wk−1‖2]
≤ p¯(1+ l¯c¯y)2(1+ g¯m¯c¯2)2q¯ rk(Qk−1),
where we apply ‖wk−1‖2 = tr(wk−1w>k−1) ≤ q¯ rk(Qk−1).
Likewise, the second term is bounded by:
E[‖L¯k(Px,uk )−1L¯k‖‖vk]‖2]≤ p¯(l¯c¯yg¯m¯+ l¯+ g¯m¯)2r¯2 rk(Rk).
These complete the proof.
Through Claims 1 and 2, (24) becomes
E[Vk]≤ δE[Vk−1]+ c.
By recursively applying the above relation, we have
E[Vk]≤ δ kE[V0]+
k−1
∑
i=0
δ ic≤ δ kE[V0]+
∞
∑
i=0
δ ic
= δ kE[V0]+
c
1−δ ,
which implies practical exponential stability of the estimation
error:
E[‖x˜uk‖2]≤
p¯
¯
p
δ kE[‖x˜u0‖2]+
cp¯
(1−δ )
= a′xe
−b′xkE[‖x˜u0‖2]+ c′x,
where (x˜uk|k)
>(Pxk )
−1(x˜uk|k) ≥ λmin((Pxk )−1)‖x˜uk|k‖2 ≥ 1p¯‖x˜uk|k‖2
and (x˜u0|0)
>(Px0 )
−1x˜u0|0 ≤ λmax((Px0 )−1)‖x˜u0|0‖2 ≤ 1
¯
p‖x˜u0|0‖2
have been applied. Constants are defined by
a′x ,
p¯
¯
p
, b′x , ln(1+ ¯
q′
h¯2a¯′2 p¯
) c′x ,
cp¯
(1−δ ) .
Since x˜k|k is a linear transformation of x˜uk|k, the same stability
holds for x˜k|k. Likewise, the same stability holds for d˜k in (10)
because it is a linear transformation of x˜k|k. We omit its
details. 
